USA v. Jamael Stubbs by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-28-2018 
USA v. Jamael Stubbs 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Jamael Stubbs" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 1125. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/1125 
This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-1539 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JAMAEL STUBBS, 
Appellant 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 1-12-cr-00009-004) 
District Judge: Hon. Christopher C. Conner 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 12, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, VANASKIE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: December 28, 2018) 
 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________________ 
  
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 A jury convicted Jamael Stubbs of using a firearm during a crime of violence in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), and brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime 
of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).  We affirmed the conviction on 
direct appeal.1  Thereafter, the District Court denied his pro se motion seeking to vacate 
his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.   However, we granted a certificate 
of appealability on the questions of whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
by failing to preserve either a sentencing challenge or a constructive amendment claim 
under Alleyne v. United States.2  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. 
  In Strickland v. Washington,3  the Supreme Court “established the familiar two 
prong test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, under which [a 
defendant] must first show that the counsel's performance was deficient and, second, that 
the deficient performance was prejudicial to the defendant.”4   
“To meet the first prong, counsel's performance must fall ‘below an objective 
standard of reasonableness considering all the circumstances.’”5  “Counsel’s performance 
is deficient only ‘when counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment.’”6  In evaluating the conduct from 
                                                 
1 United States v. Stubbs, 578 Fed. Appx. 114 (3d Cir. 2014). 
2 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). 
3 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
4 McKernan v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI, 849 F.3d 557, 564 (3d Cir. 2017). 
5 Id. (quoting Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 102 (3d Cir. 2005). 
6 Id. (quoting McBride v. Superintendent, SCI Houtzdale, 687 F.3d 92, 102 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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counsel’s perspective at the time, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”7 
The inquiry under the prejudice prong is guided by “whether there is a reasonable 
probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt 
respecting guilt.”8  Thus, a defendant is required to demonstrate “that the decision reached 
would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.”9 
II. Alleyne. 
  Stubbs was convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), which provides in 
pertinent part that anyone who “uses or carries a firearm” in relation to a “crime of 
violence” shall: 
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years; 
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not 
less than 7 years; and 
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 
not less than 10 years. 
 
Although Stubbs’s indictment did not charge him with the separate element of brandishing 
a firearm, the jury found that Stubbs or a coconspirator “did knowingly carry, use, and 
brandish a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, namely bank robbery, or 
aided and abetted another in carrying, using and brandishing a firearm during and in 
relation to a crime of violence . . . .”10  
                                                 
7 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
8 Id. at 695. 
9 Id. at 696. 
10 App. 216 (emphasis added). 
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Alleyne dealt with the same statute mentioned above and was argued on January 14, 
2013, two weeks before the start of Stubbs’s trial.  The Supreme Court decided the case on 
June 17, 2013, eighteen days after Stubbs was sentenced.  There, the Supreme Court held 
that “[w]hen a finding of fact alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, 
the fact necessarily forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be submitted to the 
jury.”11  The Court in Alleyne determined that the “brandishing” provision must be 
charged in the indictment and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.12 
We decided Stubbs’s direct appeal after the Supreme Court issued its Alleyne 
decision.  We held that Stubbs’s brandishing conviction constituted Alleyne error, but we 
affirmed the conviction and sentence “[b]ecause there was sufficient evidence to convict 
him of brandishing a firearm[,] and [concluded that] the seven-year sentence did not 
constitute reversible plain error.13   
The issue before us now is not whether an Alleyne error occurred, but rather 
whether Stubbs’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve an Alleyne sentencing 
challenge despite the fact Alleyne had not yet been decided when such an objection could 
have been raised. 
We have long held that “there is no general duty on the part of defense counsel to 
anticipate changes in the law.”14  At the time of Stubbs’s trial, the law clearly established 
                                                 
11 Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2162. 
12 Id. at 2155. 
13 Stubbs, 578 Fed. Appx. at 116, 120. 
14 Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Morse v. Texas, 
691 F.2d 770, 772 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982)); United States v. Davies, 394 F.3d 182, 189 (3d 
Cir. 2005). 
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that the brandishing and discharge factors may be found by the court at sentencing, and 
need not be charged in an indictment or submitted to the jury.15  In order for Stubbs to 
overcome the deficient performance prong under Strickland, he bears the burden of 
proving that his counsel knew (or should have known) that Alleyne was pending and that it 
might have an impact on his case but chose not to raise the objection for reasons unrelated 
to strategy.  Stubbs fails to meet this burden.  Trial counsel’s failure to object was 
consistent with the law at the time of trial and an attorney cannot be deficient for failing to 
predict changes in the law.16   
While trial counsel should have been aware of Alleyne and its potential affect, 
given our standard of review, we cannot say that his failure to object rises to the level 
required to clear both the hurdles imposed under habeas relief as well as the deference 
afforded to trial counsel’s stewardship.17 
Because we find that Stubbs cannot defeat the deficient performance prong under 
Strickland, we need not address the prejudice prong, “as both deficiency and prejudice 
must be proven to support a valid claim for relief for ineffective assistance of counsel.”18  
                                                 
15 Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), overruled by Alleyne v. United States, 133 
S. Ct. 2151 (2013). 
16 See Forte, 865 F.2d at 62.  
17 See United States v. Hollis, 569 F.2d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[I]n habeas case the 
general rule is that the petitioner himself bears the burden of proving that his conviction is 
illegal.”); Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 258 (3d Cir. 2002) (Petitioner “must establish 
that trial counsel’s stewardship fell below an object standard of reasonableness”); see also 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 
deferential.”). 
18 United States v. Travillion, 759 F.3d 281, 294 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687). 
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Thus, we conclude trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to preserve a sentencing 
challenge under Alleyne on Stubbs’s behalf prior to that decision being issued. 
III. 
 Stubbs makes a similar Sixth Amendment claim based on trial counsel’s failure to 
preserve a constructive amendment challenge under Alleyne.  Stubbs’s now argues that 
brandishing was an element of a § 924(c) charge that must have been alleged in an 
indictment.  No such charge was in the indictment but it was included on the jury verdict 
form and led to his ultimate conviction of brandishing.  
 An indictment is constructively amended when evidence, arguments, or the district 
court’s jury instructions effectively “amend[s] the indictment by broadening the possible 
bases for conviction from that which appeared in the indictment.”19  As noted above in 
part II, Harris was the applicable law at the time of Stubbs’s trial.  Under Harris, whether 
or not brandishing was included in the indictment or the jury verdict form, the sentencing 
judge would have the discretion to determine the applicable mandatory minimum 
punishment despite a finding by the jury.20  Therefore, for the reasons stated above, we, 
again, conclude Stubbs cannot show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient.  
Furthermore, there was no “broadening” of the overall charge against Stubbs, and 
no constructive amendment of the indictment when brandishing was put to the jury.21  
                                                 
19 United States v. Lee, 359 F.3d 194, 208 (3d Cir. 2004).  
20 See Harris, 536 U.S. at 558. 
21 See United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512,532 (3d Cir. 2010) (“If a defendant is 
convicted of the same offense that was charged in the indictment, there is no constructive 
amendment.”); see also Government Br. 36 (“The superseding indictment not limit 
[Stubbs’s] charge to any particular subsection . . . . While it did not explicitly state that 
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Accordingly, Stubbs’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to preserve a 
constructive amendment challenge under Alleyne on Stubbs’s behalf prior to that decision 
being issued. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the denial of Stubb’s section 2255 
petition. 
                                                 
Stubbs was accused of “brandishing” a firearm, it did accuse him of using one, and the 
brandishing of a weapon is certainly a type of use.”). 
